- NOTES TO THE FOREWARD - [1] HQ Rock Force, S3 Periodic Report #6, 21 February 1945. The report further states "NAVAL: Supporting gunfire in the ROCK POINT and WHEELER POINT areas were very effective in stunning the enemy, rendering them relatively helpless temporarily." Rather strong language and not entirely correct. [Calhoun's note: the succinct language of a soldier would be "Staff BS!”]. C Company advancing on Wheeler Point is stopped at Searchlight Point by fire from the north [ie Wheeler Point and Battery Monja]. Very quickly three men were killed. The company halted while the area in front of them was shelled by warships. The company however did not advance but rather remained at Searchlight Point and never went beyond it at any time. HQ Rock Force and HQ 503d RCT were one and the same. Rock Force was a name used to describe all US forces on the island. The only other unit of any size not in the 503d Regimental Combat Team was the 3d battalion, 34th Infantry; all other units were small specialized detachments. No one used the Rock Force title except perhaps on messages outside the unit. [Hereafter HQ 503d Periodic Report] [2] The Operations of Company "E", 503d Parachute Regiment at Wheeler Point, Island of Corregidor, Philippine Island 23 February 1945 (Luzon Campaign) (Personal Experiences of a Company commander) by Captain Hudson C. Hill, Infantry. an unpublished manuscript written by Hill while a student at The Infantry School's Advanced Infantry Officers Course #1, 1947-1948. [Hereafter Hill]* [3] Letter John Mara April 1990. [4] Letter K. Ishikawa September 1947 to JIL. Ishikawa is one of the 20 men who surrendered New Year's Day 1945. He is fluent in English. It was he who found the newspaper, written in English, proclaiming the end of the war. He says there were 6,850 Japanese troops on the island February 1945. [5] HQ 503d Periodic Report #’s 5 6,7,8, and 9. [6] Not quite never! In a manner of speaking, the 503d did finally reach Battery Monja, although it was some 44 years later when I landed, unopposed in my banca on the boulder strewn beach where the 151st's alligators had turned back under heavy fire. I slowly crawled 150 grueling feet up the steep wooded - slopes from the bottom of the cliff to Battery Monja. I wriggled through the partially blocked casemate, the only entrance still open into the battery's empty tunnel and vaults. Countless tons of earth and rocks had, over time, broken off the sheer cliffs and tumbled into the two other openings, whence heavy fire aimed at E Company had come, completely closing them. [7] The 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry relieved the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry on 25 February and took over responsibility for the entire island when the 503d left 8 March 1945. An amphibious assault by the 151st Infantry at Wheeler Point is described in an article by Lieutenant Perry R. McMahon appearing in the Coast Artillery Journal July/ August 1945, "Retaking the Harbor Defenses on Manila and Subic". "A destroyer was called in to fire point blank in the caves, and two alligators with 20mm cannons went in close. The Japs opened up with mortars and machine guns and the alligators were caught in the crossfire. “We had to get out,”said the officer in charge, 'but we got off several rounds of WP and bazooka fire.'" The Japanese weren't ready to give up their fortress that day. [8] Belote, James and William Corregidor, the Saga of a Fortress, [New York; Harper and Row 1967, pp. 260 and 261 [note: page numbers refer to Jove paperback reprint and may not apply to the hardcover edition]. It wasn't until New Year's Day 1946, that the Japanese garrison at battery Monja decided to give Battery Monja up. Company G, 342d Infantry, a Quartermaster Graves Registration detachment and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit were the only units present on the island on the momentous occasion. The Belote's describe the events that day. "On new Year's Day of 1946 Sergeant James 'Moon' Mullins was astonished to see a formation of twenty Japanese, headed by an Army junior officer, marching toward him waving surrender flags. Bowing, the officer presented a document in excellent English, proffering their capitulation. [They] had not learned of Japan's surrender until one of the men found an old newspaper." * Note by Calhoun: Most of the 503d officer who remained in the Army attended the Infantry school's Advanced Infantry Officers course. Captain Laurence Browne changed branches to Armor, but I believe he attended the Advanced Armor Course. One of the assignments to the students was to write a monograph. Most of the officers who participated in the Corregidor campaign wrote their monograph on the subject of this campaign. The experience's of Hudson Hill related in Lieutenant General EN. Flanagan, Jr.'s book "Corregidor, The Rock Force Assault" are taken from Hill's monograph. One fact should be brought to the attention of the reader concerning the use of monographs as historical documents. After I learned of these Corregidor monographs, I set out to collect all of them that I possibly could, and I was quite successful; however, one of the monograph writers who attended the Advanced Infantry Course, Ed Flash, gave me the following admonition in a letter written August 8, 1988: "On monographs Bill- I don't think you will get much of the small unit tactical Corregidor operations. If I recall correctly, our monograph guide lines were to pick and stick more or less along doctrinal mission objectives, Big picture stuff - lessons learned and how to improve future operations. When I attended the Advanced Course ('49-‘50) the Course included up through Army level. In '50 I was often in position of Army Commander committing my divisions to battle. After graduating I found it difficult to accept assignments below division level, Ha-Ha. Didn't enjoy the challenge at battalion, regimental level! In parades and ceremonies I use to order division commanders to "Fall In Your Division!!!, Ha-Ha". Monographs, periodic reports, etc., what's the difference? Both say what they want the reader to believe and not necessarily what happened. All Benning alumni know the proper answer is the school solution; but just as well known is the ode to Lieutenant Jones "who died the night he tried using the school solution...." Calhoun.
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