The next step in the plan is
the air movement. There are several factors that must be carefully
considered, these are the aircrafts available, the number of troops that
are to be transported, the movement distance from the marshalling area
to the drop zone. Naturally the meteorological conditions at the time
must be considered. For the CORREGIDOR operation there were available 36
C-47 aircraft. The estimated flight time from MINDORO to the target was
1 hour and 15 minutes. The strength of the RCT was approximately 3000
men with their equipment. Thus we see the flight plan developing as 3
separate lifts since it is impractical to split battalion combat teams.
(39)
The following are excerpts
from FO No 9, Hq 503d RCT, dated 13 February 1945 and explain the
tactical plan of the Commander. (40)
The 3d Battalion, 503d RCT
with Battery A and one (1) platoon of Battery D, 462d F.A. Battalion and
3d Platoon 161 Airborne Engineer Company attached will:
(1) Drop on Fields �A� and
�B� (See Map D) at 0830I and secure drop area.
(2) Upon being relieved by
the 2d Battalion, advance and seize the high ground approximately 600
yards NE of the Hospital. (See Map D)
(3) Support the amphibious
landing of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry by fire.
(4) Effect contact with 3d
Battalion, 34th.
The 2d Battalion with
Battery B and one (1) platoon Battery D, 462d F.A. Battalion attached
will:
(1) Drop on Fields �A� and
�B� at 1215I and relieve the 3d Battalion from defense of the perimeter
around the drop area.
(2) Exploit the terrain
north and west of the Drop Zone.
The 1st Battalion with
Battery C and one (1) platoon Battery D 462d F.A. Battalion attached
will:
(1) Drop on Fields �A� and �B� on D + 2 at 0830I as RCT Reserve.
(2) Be
prepared to exploit terrain south of the Drop Zones.
Regimental Headquarters
Company, Service Company, Battalion Headquarters, 462d F.A., and the 161
Engineer Company (-) would drop with the 1st and 2d lift and perform
normal duties of administration, communications, supply, fire direction,
demolition and medical service. The Regimental Executive officer would
come in with the 3d lift on D + 2. Executive officers of companies in
the 2d and 3d lifts would jump with the 1st lift, so that they would be
familiar with the situation and the area of operation of their company
when it arrived. (41)
The 3d Battalion, 34th
Infantry would make an overwater movement from MARIVELESE, and land on
San Jose Beach (See Map D) on D + 1 at 1030I, seize and hold Malinta
Hill, and make contact with the 503d on Topside. The 3d came under
command of ROCK Force upon coming ashore. (42)
In the plan for the aerial
assault, one of the basic principles of airborne operations must be
omitted. If one looks at Fields �A� and �B�, he can readily see that
these are the only drop zones on TOPSIDE, and that they are only 1,050
feet and 975 feet respectively. From this it can be seen that a
variation from the normal must be used to get the troops on the two
small fields. The plan for this was to have the aircraft split up into
two columns as they approached the island. They were to fly in trail
across �A� and �B� fields with 25 second intervals between plans. It was
estimated that eight men could jump on each pass. To get the men on the
field, the Jumpmaster must consider the prevailing wind which in this
case was a headwind blowing 15-20 M.P.H. The altitude was 350 feet. With
these factors in view, the Jumpmaster would have to delay his jump
command over the �go� point so that the headwind wouldn�t blow his men
off the field. Plans were made for adjustment of altitudes and jumping
signals from the control plane circling over the formation. (43)
In considering the aerial
assault, we must keep in mind that the Japanese airforce was almost
non-existent at this time and we had air cover throughout the flight.
The logistical support for
the operation was as follows: Four days prior to D-Day, an advance
element of three officers and fifty men would be sent to San Marcelino
with equipment that would arrive by water. This detail would land at
Mariveles with elements of the 39th Division. When the beach on
CORREGIDOR was clear, they would land and set up a rock force supply
dump on San Jose beach. All supplies arriving would be placed in this
dump. Plans were also made for aerial supply from the rear base at
MINDORO. These supplies would be placed in a dump on topside. (44)
The overall plan of the rock
force Commander emerges in four phases, and it is in these four phases
that the narration will be covered. They are: Phase I, The Aerial
Assault on Topside. Phase II, The Amphibious Assault. Phase III,
Destruction of the Enemy on Topside. Phase IV, Destruction of the Enemy
East of MALINTA HILL. (45)
FINAL PREPARATION AND THE
AIRLIFT (See Map A) (46)
On D-Day the 161st R.C.T.
and the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry went ashore at MARIVELES as
planned. On MINDORO, last minute preparations were being made. Newsmen
and photographers arrived, more briefings of pilots and jumpmasters were
held. Aircraft were parked, last minute maintenance performed, and
numbers were chalked on the planes. Parachutes and equipment bundles
were issued. All bundles were rolled and checked for the last time.
Weapons were cleaned and oiled. Ammunition was issued, each man carrying
two W-P grenades and two fragmentation grenades. Down in the artillery,
howitzers were cleaned and packed into parachutes. Additional
information was received from XI Corps, Headquarters. Services for the
faiths were available, with more than the usual numbers attending.
Letters were written and carefully censored. Tents were struck, rolled
and turned into S-4. Flight Manifests were made and turned into R.C.T.
headquarters. The parking plan and flight plan was issued to the
battalions and separate companies, according to SOP. An extra canteen
was issued to each man along with four meals of K-ration. Each platoon
leader took his platoon to the briefing room, and using the terrain
model gave them the big picture, the company mission and the mission of
the platoon. During the evening, captured Japanese film of the surrender
of CORREGIDOR in 1942 was shown. The film showed the Japs mistreating
American PWs and stomping the American flag into the ground. After
waking up in the middle of the night as per usual and eating a breakfast
of soggy pancakes and syrup, the first lift entrucked at 0600 and moved
to ELMORE and BILL Air strips. By 0700 hours all troops were enplaned.
The aircraft took off, made up their formation and winged their way
toward CORREGIDOR. (47)
While the transports were
closing on CORREGIDOR, B-24s and A-20s were bombing and strafing the
island. These aircraft picked up light ack-ack, but immediately
smothered it with machine gun fire. One flight of A-20s were on stand by
with smoke, should the rock force commander call for it. The Navy also
closed in for a few broadsides at the rock.
Veteran troops of the 3rd
Battalion, 34th Infantry were also busy, leading on their landing craft
and making ready for their landing at 1030I. (48)
NARRATION
PHASE I, THE AERIAL ASSAULT
At 0825I, 16th February,
troops at MARIVELES picked up tiny specks in the sky and all who were
not engaged with the Nips sat down to watch one of the most spectacular
shows of the Pacific War. At 0830I, the control ship of the formation
was over CORREGIDOR. A-20s were making their last strafing run over
topside. A curtain of dust hung over the whole island. The transports
approached the island in two columns and at exactly 0833I the green
light went on in the lead ship over �B� Field. (See Map E) The first
paratrooper, Lieutenant Colonel John Erickson, Battalion Commander of
the 3rd Battalion, counted off four seconds and stepped into thin air.
The rest of his stick followed at split second intervals. Phase I had
begun. The chutes had hardly opened before the troops were preparing for
one of the roughest, most rugged landings, they would ever make. The
same action was taking place on �A� Field. By 0850 the drop was
completed and the planes were MINDORO bound for another load. (49)
The sky was clear,
visibility unlimited, while down on the rock amid the underbrush,
splintered trees, wrecked buildings, bomb crates, Japanese machine gun
nests, caves and at the waters edge, troops of the RCT were beginning to
assemble. It is during this stage of the assault that airborne troops
are most vulnerable. Several troopers were blown over the cliffs and
landed among the Japanese defenders. It was one of these groups, while
fighting their way Topside, met and killed the Japanese Commander of the
island near BREAKWATER POINT. (See Map E) This was confirmed by a PW
captured several days later. It was at this stage that prior training of
service and administrative personnel, in close combat, came to the
front. The rock force CP was established in the barracks on the north
side of the parade ground. (See Map E) Communications, both radio and
wire, were in to the 3rd Battalion, who had formed a perimeter defense
around Topside, running generally along the 500 foot contour line. (See
Map E) The Regimental Aid station was also set up in the barracks.
Medical personnel from 3rd Battalion, Regimental Headquarters, and
Artillery were pooled. All these units used the same facilities since
they were so close together. Casualties began to pour in, mostly jump
injuries. Regimental Headquarters and Service Company had to furnish
extra men to help the Medics carry litters and recover medical bundles
dropped from the planes. Even with this augmentation, there were not
enough men to do the job right. Few medical records were kept during the
first few days. It is better to help a wounded man, than to have a
record of a dead one. Jump casualties were not as high as had been
expected. It was estimated that 15% of the first lift were casualties.
It was several days before an accurate figure was available. (50)
All during this time, the
rock force CP was under small arms fire from both inside and outside of
the perimeter. The Commander was then handed another problem, the wind
had increased to about 25 miles per hour by 1015. The second lift due at
1230 might not be able to jump. At 1100 hours the American flag was run
up on Topside under a hail of machine gun and sniper fire. At 1240, the
Second Battalion began to drop, the wind had died down to about 10 miles
per hour. They had plenty of other trouble though, the Japs were now
awake and as with the first lift, they jumped into light anti-aircraft
fire which damaged some planes and wounded a few personnel in the
planes. Experience in the first lift had showed that it was better to
delay six seconds after the go point. As a result, only a few jumpers
drifted over the cliffs and into the sea. Most of the men landed well up
on Topside. The jumpers in the air came in for more ground fire than the
first lift, which had caught the Japs completely by surprise. Our Small
Arms fire silenced some of the Jap guns, but it was difficult to fire
since our troops were landing among the Japs. Several men of the second
lift landed shooting and some were killed before they got out of the
parachute harness. (51)
When the Second Battalion
reported into the CP Net, they relieved the 3rd Battalion on the
perimeter, which left them free to start the consolidation of Topside.
For the remainder of the day, the 3rd Battalion fought as companies and
platoons. Their patrols spread out like the fingers on your hands and
with the help of Naval gunfire began to probe the Japanese positions.
H Company under Captain Joe
Conway pushed a platoon out on the knob about 700 yards southeast of
BATTERY POINT. (See Map E) Here they found some very fine defensive
positions. Why the Japs gave up these positions without a fight is known
only to the oriental mind. G Company moved into the old American AA
emplacements, 500 yards west of the south dock. (See Map E) It was from
the above positions, that the amphibious assault was supported by fire.
Fifty caliber machine guns were set up in the buildings on the east side
of �B� field to help with this task. (See Map E) While G and H Companies
were supporting the landing of the 34th, 3rd Battalion Headquarters,
Regimental Headquarters, and Service Companies were mopping up inside
perimeter on Topside. G Company in their positions could place fire on
the road from Bottomside to Topside. (52)
By 1100 hours part of the
field artillery battery was assembled and ready to fire for the force.
The only problems they had were securing their ammunition bundles and
firing their howitzers under sniper fire. During the day, their guns
were used as a direct fire weapon, to silence an enemy position, or fire
HE into a cave or building. (53)
During the first lift, one
of our planes carrying a demolition section from Regimental Headquarters
Company developed engine trouble, and had to drop out of formation while
out at sea. A message from the Command Ship of the second lift informed
the Rock commander that the plane had made land over LUZON and that the
troops had bailed out near SAN MARCELINO. It was later learned, that the
troops were picked up, flown back to MINDORO, and came in with the 1st
Battalion.
By 1500 hours, the Rock
Force Commander felt the situation was well in hand. He requested
permission for the third drop to be cancelled. He recommended that XI
Corps arrange for the planes to fly over CORREGIDOR, drop their bundles
on �A� Field, land at SAN MARCELINO, (See Map B) and come in by landing
craft on SAN JOSE beach. This plan would give Colonel Jones one
Battalion Combat Team, intact, without the causalities they would
sustain on a parachute drop. The XI Corps Commander concurred with the
recommendation, and made necessary arrangement for the change in plan.
At 1700 hours the 3rd
Battalion, less G and H Companies, pulled back into the perimeter on
Topside. Machine guns were put into position, positions checked,
artillery and mortars registered, and coordination had been made for
destroyers to fire star shells during the night for illumination. At
this stage, he who controlled Topside, controlled CORREGIDOR.
Rock Force Headquarters
began to take on the look of all Headquarters. The place had been swept
out, a few desks and chairs were found, one being carved teak wood,
quite out of place but substantial. Maps were made up on boards and
reports were coming in. The place was still under sporadic small arms
fire. Documents taken from seven dead Japs near the barracks gave the
first identification of the enemy on the Island. They were members of a
naval unit, all were well fed and equipped. (54)
During the early part of the
evening, a staff meeting was held to lay plans for the coming of
daylight. It seems as though daylight was always a scarce substance
during this operation. The plans were simple. Each Battalion was given a
sector and told to kill all of the Japs in it. From this meeting came
the first fairly accurate casualty report for the drop and for the
subsequent action. The reported figure of jump injuries was 161, but
more were expected to come in for treatment when things quieted down a
bit. This proved to be true, the final figures on jump casualties were
as follows 3 KIA on jump due to malfunctions of the parachute, 2 KIA on
striking obstacles on landing, KIA before they were out of their harness
8, and injuries running from light to severe - 203. Nine men were blown
over the cliffs into the water and were picked up by PT boats. A total
of 11%. (55) At this briefing and all others called by the Rock Force
Commander, he followed a set pattern. He merely gave each Battalion a
mission; he then asked the Battalion Commander what help he wanted to do
the job. It then became the Task Force Commander�s job to coordinate the
firepower and logistical support necessary to complete the job. This
method proved very effective. At this meeting, a status of weapons was
rendered. The F.A. had only 5 howitzers in action, out of 9 dropped, 2
were damaged on landing, and 2 more were under such heavy enemy fire
that they were unable to retrieve them the first day. (56) Several 81
mortars and light machine guns were damaged on hitting rocks or other
obstacles on landing.
Airstrikes were teed up for
the 17th. and plans were made to cover all of Topside with fire while
the 1st Battalion (3rd lift) was dropping their bundles on �A� field.
During the night, the enemy
was seen moving about apparently trying to get organized. They probed
our perimeters all night, and a few rounds of mortar fire fell on our
position. Communication wires were cut and men were hit. The Medics
worked as best they could, but movement at night was restricted.
PHASE II, THE AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT
At 1030I, the 3rd Battalion,
34th Infantry hit SAN JOSE beach (See Map E) after a terrific
bombardment by rocket ships, cruisers, and destroyers, they crossed the
beach under enemy fire and lost several vehicles to enemy mines along
the waters edge. One of these vehicles contained the radio equipment
with which Rock Force was to communicate with XI Corps. When this
information was sent to the Task Force Commander, it was not news. The
3rd Battalion, 503d supporting the landing by fire had seen the incident
and reported it to the Commander. The Battalion Commander of the 34th
called for Naval gunfire which silenced some of the automatic fire his
unit was getting while crossing the open beach. The 34th then scaled the
300-foot MALINTA HILL. By 1330 this fine Battalion was astride the hill
and had the Island cut into two parts. Much heavy close-in fighting was
to take place for them to stay on MALINTA. Part of their mission was
accomplished. The link-up with the paratroopers on Topside was easier
said than done. Contact under fire was made with the 3rd Battalion 503,
but it was to be late on the 18th before the road to Topside was opened.
(57) During the night, the 34th dug in as best they could. They, too,
were having trouble with prowlers. During the night, they had to drive
back an insane Bonzai charge. Some of the Japs were using sawed-off
shotguns captured from the Americans in 1942. An undetermined number of
the enemy was observed attempting to move west along the road north of
MALINTA HILL. (See Map E) Fire was called down on them with unobserved
results. All in all, there were few men who slept on CORREGIDOR during
the night 16 February, 1945. (58)
PHASE III, DESTRUCTION OF
THE ENEMY ON TOPSIDE
Daylight of the 17th found
the dead of both sides laying out in the open. When the sun came up they
began to smell and collect flies. Our dead were picked up, but no one
worried about the Japs. The wounded were moved to the aid station, K
rations were eaten, and some of the last canteen of water was drunk. A
silence settled over some sections of the Island, while all hell broke
loose at others, as our patrols encountered the enemy. During the night,
the Japs had moved back into the positions that they had been driven
from the day before. It was now apparent that each position occupied
would have to be destroyed, and every cave and pillbox sealed off. So on
the 17th was set the pattern that systematically destroyed the Nip on
CORREGIDOR. (59)
At 0830 the 3rd lift was
over �A� field, dropping their equipment bundles. This flight also came
in for ground fire from the enemy. The 1st Battalion landed at SAN
MARCELINO, (See Map B) were trucked to SUBIC BAY (See Map B), and via
destroyers to SAN JOSE beach on CORREGIDOR. (See Map E) This landing was
also contested by heavy automatic and sniper fire which pinned the
Battalion on the beach until Naval gunfire silenced it. After crossing
the beach and reorganizing the Battalion, it was decided that they would
go into a perimeter defense on Bottomside. (See Map F) The time was 1630
and it was getting dark. (60)
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